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Abstract
Recently, researchers claimed that people are intuitively inclined to cooperate with reflection causing them to behave
selfishly. Empirical support for this claim came from experiments using a 4-player public goods game with a marginal return
of 0.5 showing that people contributed more money to a common project when they had to decide quickly (i.e., a decision
based on intuition) than when they were instructed to reflect and decide slowly. This intuitive-cooperation effect is of high
scientific and practical importance because it argues against a central assumption of traditional economic and evolutionary
models. The first experiment of present study was set up to examine the generality of the intuitive-cooperation effect and
to further validate the experimental task producing the effect. In Experiment 1, we investigated Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT) workers’ contributions to a 4-player public goods game with a marginal return of 0.5 while we manipulated the
knowledge about the other players’ contribution to the public goods game (contribution known vs. contribution unknown),
the identity of the other players (humans vs. computers randomly generating contributions) and the time constraint (time
pressure/intuition vs. forced delay/reflection). However, the results of Experiment 1 failed to reveal an intuitive-cooperation
effect. Furthermore, four subsequent direct replications attempts with AMT workers (Experiments 2a, 2b, 2c and Experiment
3, which was conducted with naı¨ve/inexperienced participants) also failed to demonstrate intuitive-cooperation effects.
Taken together, the results of the present study could not corroborate the idea that people are intuitively cooperative,
hence suggesting that the theoretical relationship between intuition and cooperation should be further scrutinized.
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Introduction
Rand, Greene and Nowak [1] recently asked themselves the
fundamental question ‘‘… whether people are predisposed
towards selfishness, behaving cooperatively only through active
self-control; or whether they are intuitively cooperative, with
reflection and prospective reasoning favouring ‘rational’ self-
interest.(pp. 428)’’. In their paper, Rand and colleagues hypoth-
esized that people develop strong cooperative intuitions because
cooperation is typically rewarded in daily live. A crucial prediction
of this social heuristics hypothesis is that people’s intuitive reaction
will be to behave cooperatively and that non-cooperative/selfish
behavior emerges only after reflection. Consistent with the social
heuristics hypothesis, Rand and colleagues found in a series of
experimental and correlational studies that participants tend to
behave more cooperatively under conditions promoting intuitive
decision making than under conditions promoting reflective
decision making. These findings are remarkable because they
are clearly at variance with a historically influential philosophical
position stating that people are self-centered acting socially only
due to reflection/rational self-control. Additionally, the findings
argue against a central assumption in traditional evolutionary
models and economic models that people should display consistent
behavioral styles (either cooperative or non-cooperative). Contrary
to these models Rand and colleagues’ findings suggest people can
switch from one style to another dependent on their mind set
(intuition vs. reflection). Hence, it might not come as a surprise
that Rand and colleagues ‘paper has attracted quite a lot of
attention from the scientific community but also from the popular
press.
Crucial empirical support for Rand and colleagues’ [1] social
heuristics hypothesis came from two experiments revealing a
causal relationship between participants’ monetary contribution to
a common project in a one-shot public goods game. In Study 6, an
internet experiment with Amazon Mechanical Turk participants,
and in Study 7, an experiment in a psychological laboratory with
college students, participants received a fee for taking part in the
experiment and they were told they could earn a bonus as a result
of the outcome of a one-shot public goods game. For the game,
participants were given an additional amount of money and they
had to decide how much of this money, if any, they wanted to
contribute to a common project. Also, participants were informed
they collaborated on this common project with three other
unknown players of whom the contributions to the common
project were not known. The bonus each of the four players
received was calculated as follows: (additional money – own
contribution) + 2*(sum of the contributions)/4. This implies that
the highest personal payoff is obtained by defecting (i.e.,
contributing nothing to the common project) whatever the total
contribution of the other three players is. After participants read
the instructions on the one-shot public goods game they were
taken to a decision screen. A random half of the participants were
required to make a decision on their contribution within 10
seconds (time pressure condition: intuitive decision making),
whereas the other half of the participants had to think and reflect
at least 10 seconds before making their contribution (reflection/
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forced delay condition). In line with the social heuristics
hypothesis, both experiments showed an intuitive-cooperation effect.
That is, the mean contribution was significantly higher in the
intuition/time-pressure condition than in the reflection/forced-
delay condition.
Experiment 1
Rand and colleagues [1] demonstrated the intuitive-cooperation
effect through an experimental procedure in which participants
were not aware of the team members’ contributions. However, this
situation is very uncommon in real-life cooperation. Therefore, the
aim of Experiment 1 was to examine whether the intuitive-
cooperation effect emerges under a more realistic experimental
procedure in which participants are aware of the team members’
contributions. On the one hand, one could argue that when the
team members’ contributions are known the social heuristics, i.e.,
the initial tendency to cooperate, are replaced by a different
heuristic such as contributing ‘‘a fair share’’ to the common
project. One the other hand, because social heuristics are assumed
to have evolved due to extensive positive experience with
collaboration, the intuitive-cooperation effect may be found for
known and unknown team members’ contributions.
In addition to examine the generality of the intuitive-cooper-
ation effect, our first experiment aimed at further validating the
social heuristics hypothesis. According to Rand and colleagues [1],
social heuristics have developed as a result of cooperation with
other humans. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the
social heuristics are triggered in economic games, such as the one
Rand and colleagues [1] used, when participants collaborate with
other people. However, when participants interact with computers
that randomly generate contributions to a common project, it is
unlikely they will use the social heuristics to make their
contribution. Consequently, the social heuristics hypothesis
predicts an intuitive-cooperation effect when participants are
playing with humans but not when they are playing with
computers. This prediction was tested in Experiment 1.
Method
Below, we will present a summary of Experiment 19s method
and the results. For detailed information, we refer the reader to the
Supporting Information (File S1).
In Experiment 1, participants played a one-shot public goods
game identical to the one used by Rand and colleagues [1].
However, contrary to Rand and colleagues we explicitly stated the
pay-off rule and we provided an example of a pay-off calculation.
Furthermore, we created a 26262 between-subjects design by
manipulating the identity of the team members (humans vs.
computers), the contribution knowledge (contribution of team members
unknown vs. contribution of team members known), and the decision
constraint (contribution under time pressure vs. contribution after a
forced delay). We also assessed participants’ motivation for their
contribution and their quantitative game understanding.
Results
For the statistical analyses reported in this paper, we used an
alpha level of .05 as a threshold of statistical significance.
Contributions. Table 1 presents the relevant descriptive
statistics of the contributions for participants who obeyed the time
constraints. For the statistical test in Experiment 1, we submitted
the contributions to a 2 contribution knowledge (contribution unknown
vs. contribution known)6 2 team members (humans vs. computers)
6 2 decision constraint (time pressure vs. forced delay) factorial
analysis of variance (anova). The contributions of three partici-
pants from the time-pressure condition were excluded from the
analysis, because these participants failed to meet the time
constraint, i.e., 10 s, in this particular condition. Note that we
excluded participants because we aimed at following Rand and
colleagues’ [1] analysis procedure. The sample means in the two
human conditions revealed one intuitive-cooperation effect
(contribution unknown) and one negative intuitive-cooperation
effect (contribution known). Additionally, in both computer
conditions we found that the mean contribution was higher in
the time-pressure condition than in the forced-delay condition.
However, the analysis failed to demonstrate significant effects
(maximum F = 3.28), and without any exception the effect sizes
were extremely small (maximum partial eta squared = .012).
Decision Times. Table 2 presents the relevant descriptive
statistics of the decision times for participants who obeyed the time
constraints. As expected, the mean and median decision times
were lower in the time-pressure conditions than in the forced-delay
conditions. It should be noted that our means and standard
deviations were different from those reported by Rand and
colleagues [1] in their Study 6 (i.e., Time pressure: M = 6.99,
Sd = 2.06; Forced Delay: M = 34.83, Sd = 42.28, but judging from
the latter large Sd, the mean decision time in the forced-delay
condition might be due to participants who took a very long time
to make their decision).
Quantitative understanding and motivation. After par-
ticipants made their contribution, their quantitative understanding
of the game’s pay-off schedule was assessed. Quantitative
understanding was measured by presenting participants with a
hypothetical contribution scenario, i.e., four players each contrib-
uting 10 cents to the common project, along with the question to
determine the bonus each participant would receive. The correct
answer to the question was 50 cents. Only 10% of the participants
provided this answer. A partially correct answer was 20 cents. In
that case, a participant correctly added up the contribution of all
four players, doubled the resultant contribution, and divided the
outcome by 4. Yet, this participant did not add to these 20 cents
the part of the initial amount of money that was left after the
contribution, i.e., 30 cents. The 20-cents answer was given by 33%
of the participants. Furthermore, 47% of the participants did not
show game understanding. These participants answered the
comprehension question with a bonus that was neither 50 cents
nor 20 cents. The remaining 10% of the participants gave no
answer or an unclear answer. Hence, if we apply a lenient
criterion, a mere 43% of the participants (the percentages of the
50-cents category and 20-cents category combined) showed
understanding of the game’s pay-off schedule.
We should note that we performed the above presented 2
contribution knowledge (contribution unknown vs. contribution known)
62 team members (humans vs. computers)62 decision constraint (time
pressure vs. forced delay) factorial anova on the contributions of
the 43% of the participants demonstrating game understanding.
The outcomes of this anova as well as the conditions means were
comparable to the results obtained with all participants.
We also asked participants to indicate the motivation underlying
their contribution. Table 3 presents the motivation counts. The
table contains the response category of 283 participants; 3
participants were not included because they did not give a
motivation for their contribution. Two chi-square tests revealed a
marginally significant relationship between motivation and deci-
sion constraint when humans were the team members,
x2(1) = 3.049, p = .089, odds ratio = 1.8, but not when computers
were the team members, x2(1) = 1.028, p = .311, odds ratio = 1.4.
Contrary to the social heuristics hypothesis, the marginally
significant chi-square test for humans indicated that 43% of the
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people in the time-pressure conditions reported cooperative motiva-
tions compared to 57% of the participants in the forced-delay
conditions.
Discussion Experiment 1
The goals of Experiment 1 were to examine whether the
intuitive-cooperation effect generalizes to an experimental situa-
tion in which the team members’ contributions are known, and
whether the intuitive-cooperation effect disappears when partic-
ipants interact with computers that randomly generate contribu-
tions. However, the results did not reveal any intuitive-cooperation
effect: for each of the four team member x contribution knowledge
combinations the difference between the mean contribution in the
time-pressure (intuitive decision making) and the forced-delay condition
(reflection) was small and non-significant. The failure to find an
intuitive-cooperation effect in the unknown human condition was
surprising because this condition was conceptually similar to Rand
and colleagues’ [1] Study 6, in which a clear intuitive-cooperation
was found. Hence, in the unknown human condition, we did not
replicate Rand and colleagues’ intuitive-cooperation effect.
Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c
The inconsistency between our results in the unknown human
condition and the intuitive-cooperation effect in Rand and
colleagues’ [1] Study 6, may be due to unintended differences
between their experimental procedure and materials and ours.
One of these differences might be particularly relevant: we
informed participants explicitly about the public goods game pay-
off schedule and we included a pay-off calculation example in the
instruction. However, it might be possible (see Rand and
colleagues’ Supplement Information for a similar argument) that
these instruction features had induced reflective thinking in our
participants, and this in turn might have erased the intuitive-
cooperation effect.
Furthermore, in our experiment participants entered their
contribution in a box, whereas participants in Rand and
colleagues’ [1] study used a slider. Also, in the forced-delay conditions
of our Experiment 1, the timing of the contribution was
experimenter controlled. By contrast, participants in Rand and
colleagues’ study had to keep track of the time themselves. Yet, we
think it would be highly unlikely, and with respect to theoretical
generalizability very undesirable when the intuitive-cooperation
effect would turn out to depend on the way in which the
contribution is made (typing a number in a box or using a slider)
and/or the timing of the decision in the forced-delay condition
(experimenter controlled or participant controlled).
In an attempt to replicate Rand and colleagues’ [1] intuitive-
cooperation effect, we conducted three experiments in which we
sequentially changed the three abovementioned aspects of the
procedure in our Experiment 1.These replications are important
because they allow us to assess the reliability of the intuitive-
cooperation effect with Mechanical Turk participants (see [2], [3],
[4], [5], [6] and [7] for papers on replication in psychological
research). If our instruction in Experiment 1 had indeed cancelled
out the intuitive-cooperation effect due to the induction of a
reflective decision mode, then the intuitive-cooperation effect
should re-emerge in Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c.
Method
For detailed information about the method in Experiments 2a,
2b and 2c, we refer the reader to the Supporting Information (File
S1). In Experiment 2a, we copied the instruction and design from
Rand and colleagues’ [1] Study 6. However, contrary to Rand and
colleagues’ procedure, participants entered their contribution in a
box, and decision timing in the forced delay condition was
experimenter controlled. Experiment 2b was identical to Exper-
iment 2a with the only exception that participants used a slider to
make their contribution. Lastly, Experiment 2c was identical to
Experiment 2b with the only exception that the timing of the
contribution decision was participant controlled in the forced-delay
condition.
Results
Contributions and decision times. Table 4 presents the
relevant descriptive statistics of the contributions in Experiments
2a, 2b and 2c for participants who obeyed the time constraints.
Three independent t-tests were performed to test whether the
mean contributions differed between the two conditions. None of
these tests reached significance and the effect-sizes were small (all
p’s..453, all Cohen’s d’s,.16).
In addition, Table 5 presents the relevant descriptive statistics of
the decision times in Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c for participants
who obeyed the time constraints. The mean and median decision
times were lower in the time-pressure conditions than in the forced-
delay conditions.
Discussion Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c
Like in Experiment 1, we failed to demonstrate an intuitive-
cooperation effect in Experiments 2a through 2c. Hence, also in
these experiments we did not replicate the intuitive-cooperation
effect found by Rand and colleagues’ [1] in their Study 6.
However, our replication failures are consistent with the
findings from a recent paper by Rand, Peysakhovich, Kraft-Todd,
Newman, Wurzbacher, Nowak and Greene [8]. Based on an
overview of public good games studies they conducted with
Mechanical Turk participants from the United States, Rand and
colleagues showed that the intuitive-cooperation effect has
Table 3. Motivation Counts in as a Function of the Team Members and Decision Constraints in Experiment 1.
Motivation
Cooperation No Cooperation Total (Row)
Human Pressure 32 42 74
Forced delay 41 30 71
Computer Pressure 24 35 59
Forced Delay 39 40 79
Total (Column) 136 147 283
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0096654.t003
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declined and eventually disappeared since their first study (i.e., the
study published in the 2012 Nature paper as Study 6). Furthermore,
the outcomes of a survey distributed in April 2013 among United
States Mechanical Turk workers demonstrated that the median
number of self-reported participations in public good games was
equal to 10. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume United States
Mechanical Turk workers have experience with studies involving
public good games.
This experience is relevant in the light of findings from Rand
and colleagues’ [1] Study 9. In that study, intuition was primed by
asking participants to write a paragraph about a situation in which
either their intuition had led them in the right direction, or careful
reasoning had led them in the wrong direction. By contrast,
reflection was primed by asking participants to write about either a
situation in which intuition had led them in the wrong direction, or
careful reasoning had led them in the right direction. Subsequent-
ly, participants had to decide on their contribution in a one-shot
public goods game (i.e., the same game Rand and colleagues [1]
used in their Study 6). After they made their contribution
participants had to answer the following question: ‘‘To what
extent have you participated in studies like this before? (i.e., studies
were you choose how much to keep for yourself versus
contributing to benefit others) ‘‘. Participants who chose the
response ‘‘never’’ were classified as naı¨ve; participants with other
responses were classified as experienced. The results demonstrated
that naı¨ve participants’ average contribution was higher when
primed with intuition than when primed with reflection.
Conversely, for experienced participants the mean contribution
was similar in both conditions. To put it differently, the intuitive-
cooperation effect was found for naı¨ve participants but not for
experienced participants. This interaction between experience and
the intuitive-cooperation effect has been conceptually replicated
by Rand and colleagues [8].
Experiment 3
Considering that Mechanical Turk workers from the United
States are experienced, and that the intuitive-cooperation effect
interacts with experience, it might be possible that Rand and
colleagues [8] recent failures to find an intuitive-cooperation effect
in Mechanical Turk experiments as well as our failures to find such
an effect in Experiment 1 and in Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c are
due to the Mechanical Turk population becoming increasingly
experienced in playing public good games. In order to test this
experience hypothesis of our replication failures, we conducted a
third experiment.
Method
Experiment 3 was an exact replication of our Experiment 2c,
but we only tested naı¨ve participants. We refer the reader to the
Supporting Information (File S1) for method details. If the
experience explanation is correct and the intuitive-cooperation
effect is only found for naı¨ve participants, the intuitive-cooperation
effect should show up in Experiment 3.
Results
Contributions and decision times. A total of 109 Me-
chanical Turk workers took part in Experiment 3. Of these
participants, 7 were excluded because they reported prior
experience, 24 other participants were excluded because they
did not meet the time constraints in their condition and 4 were
excluded because they failed to enter a valid contribution. As a
Table 4. Number of Participants (n), Mean (M), Standard Deviation (Sd) of Participants’ Contributions (in dollar cents) and the 95%
Confidence Interval (CI) per Decision Constraint Condition for Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c.
95% CI of the mean
Experiment Decision constraint n M Sd Lower Bound Upper Bound
2a Pressure 44 23.11 16.34 18.12 28.11
Forced Delay 51 23.12 16.96 18.48 27.75
2b Pressure 41 22.73 14.76 17.77 27.69
Forced Delay 47 24.60 16.95 19.97 29.23
2c Pressure 59 24.71 16.64 20.51 28.92
Forced Delay 37 22.27 15.66 16.97 27.58
Note that the maximum contribution was 40 dollar cents.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0096654.t004
Table 5. Mean (M), Standard Deviation (Sd), Median (Md), Minimum and Maximum of the Decision Times per Decision Constraint
Condition for Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c.
Experiment Decision constraint M Sd Md Minimum Maximum
2a Pressure 3.49 1.43 3.27 1.17 7.40
Forced Delay 15.09 5.97 13.11 11.18 39.73
2b Pressure 3.76 2.06 3.00 1.08 9.76
Forced Delay 15.28 6.47 12.62 10.95 37.98
2c Pressure 5.82 2.31 5.61 2.16 10.16
Forced Delay 27.55 27.43 20.59 9.52 175.76
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0096654.t005
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result, the following data analyses are based on the remaining 74
participants (38 in the time-pressure condition and 36 in the forced-
delay condition). The mean contributions in the time-pressure
condition was lower (M = 19.39, Sd = 15.72) than in the forced-delay
condition (M= 21.73, Sd = 15.42). The results showed a reversed
intuitive-cooperation effect and therefore a statistical analysis was
omitted. Furthermore, the median decision times were respectively
5.17 in the time-pressure condition and 21.34 in the forced-delay
condition.
Discussion Experiment 3
The results from Experiment 3 were consistent with the results
from the other experiments in this study. In Experiment 3, we
again failed to demonstrate an intuitive-cooperation effect. This
replication failure contradicts the experience hypothesis because it
was obtained using naı¨ve participants only.
One could argue that self-reports may not be the most valid
measures of experience. This may be true, but by using a similar
self-report as Rand and colleagues [1,8] our findings can be
compared to theirs. In addition, an anonymous reviewer proposed
that Mechanical Turk workers might lie about their experience.
However, we do not see why this would be the case. Perhaps, some
participants ignored the admission criterion (i.e., naı¨ve participants
only) because they knew the participation fee was relatively high.
Yet by using a post-experiment question we were able to filter out
experienced participants. That is, at the end of the experimental
session, we asked participants to indicate whether they had any
experience with this kind of experiments AND we informed them
they would receive their participation fee plus bonus independent
of their answer. Considering there were no negative consequences
associated with being honest, it seems unlikely that participants
would lie in response to the post-experiment question. In fact,
some participants were excluded from the experiment because
they indicated after the experiment they were not naı¨ve. In
addition, a potential danger of the lying-participants argument is
that it prevents the falsification of the theoretical framework
relating experience to the intuitive-cooperation effect. Specifically,
if self-reported naı¨ve participants show an intuitive-cooperation
effect they must have been honest about their experience, but if
naı¨ve participants fail to demonstrate intuitive-cooperation effect
they must have been lying about their experience. According to
Meehl [9] such post-hoc reasoning provides researchers with an
easy escape from the modus tollens refutation and this in turn
hampers scientific progress.
Small Scale Meta-Analysis
The present study resulted in eight estimates of intuitive-
cooperation effect: four in Experiment 1, and one in Experiments
2a, 2b, 2c and 3. Inspired by Cumming’s [10] ‘‘new statistics’’
approach we calculated a 95% confidence interval (CI) of the
population mean for each of these estimates. Figure 1 presents the
CIs in a forest plot. The squares in the forest plot represent the
point estimate of the intuitive-cooperation effect parameter, i.e.,
the difference between the mean contribution in the time-pressure
condition and the forced-delay condition (a positive difference
denotes an intuitive-cooperation effect). One way to interpret CIs
is that they indicate the precision of a parameter estimate. Given a
particular scale of measurement, wide CIs reflect more uncertainty
about the parameter than narrow CIs. The forest plot in Figure 1
demonstrates that the point estimates of the intuitive-cooperation
effect vary, that each of the estimates is associated with a high
degree of uncertainty (as evidenced by relatively wide CIs) and that
the CIs show considerable overlap. The latter indicates there are
no strong reasons to assume that the parameter estimates are
based on samples from populations with different intuitive-
cooperation effects.
The combined CI is based on a random-effects meta-analysis on
the eight intuitive-cooperation effects from the present study. The
combined CI is much narrower than the CIs of the separate
experiments, and therefore it provides a more precise estimate of
the intuitive-cooperation effect parameter. Furthermore, the
combined point estimate shows a small negative intuitive-
Figure 1. 95% Confidence intervals of the mean difference between the time-pressure and the forced-delay condition in Experiment 1
(human known to computer unknown), Experiment 2a, 2b and 2c, and Experiment 3. The combined effect from the random-effects model
is presented in the 95% Confidence interval at the bottom of the figure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0096654.g001
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cooperation effect. Also, the combined CI includes the value of 0
indicating that the combined negative intuitive-cooperation effect
is not statistically significant (at a two-tailed alpha level of .05).
General Discussion
The present study contains three Mechanical Turk experiments
in which we compared participants’ contributions in a one-shot
public goods game under time-pressure (intuitive decision making)
and after a forced-delay (reflective decision making). The three
experiments involved a total of eight comparisons, with four
showing a positive intuitive-cooperation effect, three showing a
negative intuitive-cooperation effect, and one showing a null effect.
Additionally, the positive intuitive-cooperation effects were much
smaller than the one reported by Rand and colleagues [1] in their
Study 6. Furthermore, the combined effect that emerged from the
meta-analysis revealed a small, non-significant negative intuitive
cooperation effect. Hence, the outcomes of our experiments are
inconsistent with Rand and colleagues’ original finding.
Looking at the existing literature, the intuitive-cooperation
effect appears to be rather variable. Rand and colleagues [1] found
an intuitive-cooperation effect twice in respectively a Mechanical
Turk experiment and in a psychological laboratory experiment.
However, recently Tingho¨g, Andersson, Bonn, Bo¨ttiger, Joseph-
son, Lundgren, Va¨stfja¨ll, Kirchler, and Johannesson [11] failed to
demonstrate intuitive-cooperation effects in three replications
attempts (see their Experiment 5) of Rand and colleagues’ Study
6. Furthermore, Rand and colleagues [8] showed that the
intuitive-cooperation effect has declined over time and eventually
disappeared in Mechanical Turk studies. Also, in the present study
we failed to observe an intuitive-cooperation effect in three
Mechanical Turk experiments.
Rand and colleagues [8] (see also Rand and Nowak [12])
propose that experience is an important moderator of the intuitive-
cooperation effect. In addition, they suggest that the decline of the
intuitive-cooperation effect in Mechanical Turk studies may be
due to Mechanical Turk workers becoming increasingly experi-
enced in public goods games. Empirical evidence in favor of the
experience hypothesis comes from two studies (see Rand and
colleagues [1,8]) showing that the intuitive-cooperation effect
occurs for naı¨ve participants but not for experienced participants.
However, at this point we are skeptical about the experience
hypothesis because we have concerns about the validity of the
experience measure and because we think the published data do
not provide conclusive evidence for the experience hypothesis.
Subsequently, we will elaborate on our concerns starting with the
validity issue.
Rand and colleagues [1,8] use self-reports to measure experi-
ence. Participants who indicate they never participated in public
game studies before are considered naı¨ve and participants who
indicate they participated at least once in a public game study are
considered experienced. We think there are a number of
problematic aspects to this experience measure. For one, it does
not appear to fit very well within the social heuristics hypothesis.
According to this hypothesis, people develop strong cooperative
intuitions because cooperation is typically rewarded in daily live. If
this is true, then is it seems unlikely that only a single experience in
laboratory situation is sufficient to distort a strong intuitive
tendency. In addition, it seems reasonable to also take relevant
experiences outside the lab into account when measuring
experience. In fact, Rand and colleagues [1] show in Study 10
that experience in real life is indeed correlated with the intuitive
cooperation effect. Furthermore, the experience of a participant
with public good games experiments is the result of a range of
factors, such as the number and variety of public good games in
which the participant took part, the number and variety of other
experiments, i.e., experiments that did not involve public good
games, in which a participant took part apart (participating in
these kind of experiments is likely to interfere with building up
experience in public good games), what a participant learned from
taking part in earlier public good games (this point is particularly
relevant because in Rand and colleagues’ study [1] as well as in
our Experiment 1 a high percentage of participants actually failed
to understand the task at hand), the time interval between
successive participations (longer intervals are prone to result in
participants forgetting the gist of the task), and the interval
between the last participation and a current experiment. None of
these factors are taken into account by Rand and colleagues’
experience measure. Thus, all in all we think there are strong
arguments to doubt the validity of Rand and colleagues’ [1,8]
experience measure.
But even if we ignore the problems with the validity of the
experience measure, the empirical evidence pertaining to the
experience hypothesis is mixed. Rand and colleagues [1,8] showed
intuitive-cooperation effects with naı¨ve participants. However, in
the present study, we failed to find an intuitive-cooperation effect
in Experiment 3, which was conducted with naı¨ve Mechanical
Turk participants. Similarly, Tingho¨g and colleagues [11] could
not replicate an intuitive cooperation effect in three studies with
samples of presumably naı¨ve participants. The latter two findings
are clearly inconsistent with the experience hypothesis.
Conclusion
The experiments in the present consistently failed to demon-
strate intuitive-cooperation effects. In addition, Experiment 3
showed that a failure to find an intuitive cooperation effect cannot
be attributed to experience. Furthermore, given the problems with
the validity of the experience measure used by Rand and
colleagues [1,8] and the mixed empirical support for the
experience hypothesis, we think more research is required to shed
light on the interaction between experience and the intuitive-
cooperation effect.
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